The Atomic Bazaar: The Rise of the Nuclear Poor

The Atomic Bazaar: The Rise of the Nuclear Poor Best Book, The Atomic Bazaar The Rise Of The Nuclear Poor By William Langewiesche This Is Very Good And Becomes The Main Topic To Read, The Readers Are Very Takjup And Always Take Inspiration From The Contents Of The Book The Atomic Bazaar The Rise Of The Nuclear Poor, Essay By William Langewiesche Is Now On Our Website And You Can Download It By Register What Are You Waiting For Please Read And Make A Refission For You

William Langewiesche is a journalist who has written for Vanity Fair and The Atlantic Monthly.

✸ [PDF] ✈ The Atomic Bazaar: The Rise of the Nuclear Poor By William Langewiesche ✴ –
  • Hardcover
  • 192 pages
  • The Atomic Bazaar: The Rise of the Nuclear Poor
  • William Langewiesche
  • English
  • 07 December 2017
  • 9780374106782

10 thoughts on “The Atomic Bazaar: The Rise of the Nuclear Poor

  1. says:

    Langewische looks at nuclear proliferation with the eye of an expert He offers both good news and bad On the good news side is that it is indeed very difficult to craft a reliable nuclear bomb of the Hiroshima sort Dirty bombs are another thing, but he believes that the public fear of them far outweighs their potential for harm The NPT, or Nuclear Non proliferation Treaty is viewed as both a saving grace in the effectiveness it has had during the Cold War, and a problem today inasmuch as it is a blatant exercise in hypocrisy The treaty traded five nations having a nuclear monopoly for other nations gaining access to nuclear technology for peaceful purposes Guess which side did not hold up their end So why should the USA, which has broken its pledge to non nuclear states to help them gain non weapons based nuclear expertise, get to tell them what they can and cannot do He points out that the major nations cannot really risk a nuclear confrontation because of MAD mutually assured destruction , but notes that with the spread of nuclear weapons to and third world nations, nuclear weapons have become the weapon of choice for poor nations It is no longer impossible for lesser nations to buy or develop their own nuclear technology This is a chilling thing, but the wars they will fight are likely to be local in nature I suppose that is an upside And maybe if their nationhood is threatened the way the USA and USSR viability was threatened, they may think twice.William Langewiesche from his Facebook page Langewische devotes considerable attention to the exploits of AQ Khan, the father of the Pakistani bomb It seemed to me a poor choice for him to have done so This material is available elsewhere He would have done better to explore in depth some other aspects of his large, well informed knowledge One item that was particularly informative was his discussion of a policy wonk reporter busily documenting everything in an obscure journal read only by those in the nuclear industry That was quite interesting This is a good read, one that offers some new information and perspectives on a serious policy issue, a bit wonky, but that s ok by me EXTRA STUFFThe author s FB page Langewiesche has written several books These originate in his articles Here are a few links to sites where you can find many of his outstanding articles Take a look You will not be sorry Articles in Vanity FairMore, on Longform.comAnd if that is not enough, links to on The Electric Typewriter

  2. says:

    Gives a great perspective on how easy it could be for terrorists to get their hands on nuclear material from one of the former Soviet secret nuclear cities, where international efforts are now trying to warehouse the stuff A short, gripping book, very illuminating and hard to put down.

  3. says:

    William Langewiesche s new book is a compelling mix of narrative reporting, profiles of striking individuals, and scenaric thinking about the contemporary nuclear proliferation His focus is on the mechanisms by which access to nuclear weapons technology is broadening, and what this broadening access means about the likelihood that terrorists will be able to launch a nuclear attack on a Western target The book focuses strictly on the threat of full blown nuclear bombs, disregarding the question of radiological attacks.The most interesting chapter in the book addresses the question of what it would take for would be nuclear terrorists to put together a bomb without state sponsorship Artfully weaving together detailed reporting of on the ground conditions facing would be nuclear terrorism entrepreneurs with vivid scenaric imaginings of how they would have to conduct their business in the face of that environment, the narrative takes the reader on an virtual journey along the route that illicit nuclear material would have to travel to get to the United States in the form of a bomb.Langewiesche begins in Russia, looking at nuclear facilities that indeed seem to be lightly guarded What it would take for nuclear material from one of these facilities to somehow end up in the hands of terrorists who would want to use it to attack the United States He dismisses as improbable the possibility that material stolen by strong arm methods could make it out of the country An inside job would be feasible, he concedes, but this raises the question of how an insider would execute the necessary next steps getting it out of the country say, via the Caucasus would still be difficult finding a trusted buyer say, in Istanbul almost impossible secretly constructing a bomb from the material fraught and smuggling the device say, across the Mexican border to its intended target challenging Langewiesche notes that each step would require dealing with a different network of bad actors, any of whom might betray the process One of Langewieche s most arresting passages comes with his programmatic suggestion as to how the US might want to collaborate with some of these bad actors A tired joke often repeated is that the best way to transport an atomic bomb is inside a bale of marijuana The point, of course, is that the borders are wide open The analogy, however, is fundamentally misleading, because a small amount of highly enriched uranium HEU is worth far than any conceivable load of narcotics, and it moves in a miniscule marketplace as a one shot deal, dangerous to everyone involved, difficult to replace, and of infinitely greater importance to stop Indeed, the proximity between the two trades may seem an unfortunate coincidence, but it could be turned into a fortunate one if the differences were exploited in a quiet conversation with a few key people The problem is that those people are not likely to be local officials Finding them would require casual exploration along the preexisting line of defense, in remote valleys below high mountain passes, around certain ports, and especially along the national boundaries that cross smuggling routes borders aligned primarily east and west in Central Asia, and north and south on the Caucasian side of Caspian Sea More fundamental, it would require accepting that regions beyond government control are rarely as chaotic as they seem to be to Western officials The foundation work for effective interdiction would involve poking around meekly, usually by taxi, sometimes with an amateur translator and guide The purpose would not be to recruit peasant armies and spies, but to get a feel for the informal or nongovernmental functioning of power In most areas, only two or three people are at the top, and they tend to be at once aggressive and benevolent men with interests larger than just the movement of drugs Their names would quickly become apparent Some might be dangerous to approach, but most would be hospitable to strangers On the second or third trip back, a Western agent might make it known that if ever a load of genuine HEU showed up, a large bounty would be paid On the basis of decades of reporting from lawless regions, Langewiesche concludes that these smuggle routes, which appear to Western eyes terribly threatening, are in fact tightly sewed up, nothing moves without notice, and any transborder activity requires approval The trick is to have the patience to find out who the real authorities are, and the temerity to partner with them His summary judgment is that, absent a state sponsor, a non state actor would have little chance of successfully pulling off a nuclear attack.Having dismissed the prospect of freelancing nuclear terrorists, Langewiesche turns his attention to a different global market for nuclear weapons, the very active one in which states rather than private actors are the buyers Here Langewiesche recounts with brio the story of Pakistan s chief nuclear engineer Abdul Qadeer Khan, who led Pakistan into the nuclear weapons club in 1998, while at the same time running a vast business selling nuclear bomb making technology to other states The arc of Khan s life runs from his childhood as a refugee of the Indian partition in the 1940s to Holland in the 1970s, where Khan developed the expertise to build bombs and stole the necessary blueprints through the 1980s, when Khan, now back in Pakistan, set up a series of front companies that allowed him to buy, mainly from European engineering companies, the dual use equipment above all, centrifuges necessary for Pakistan to enrich uranium to the 1990s, when Khan leveraged his job as the hero of Pakistan s nuclear program to build a lucrative personal business empire selling bomb making technologies to clients such as Libya, North Korea, Iran, and Langewiesche argues that although vanity and cupidity motivated Khan s business, it was his powerful resentment about the second class citizenship of the Global South that helped him justify it, and his hero status in Pakistan s corrupted political culture that made him believe that he could get away with it.The final chapter deals with the unraveling of Khan s business For most of the decade before 9 11, Khan was hiding his business as the world s leading nuclear proliferator in plain sight Relying exclusively on open sources, a sharp eyed nuclear industry journalist named Mark Hibbs reported through the 1990s and into 2004 on Pakistan s central role as a nuclear proliferator, helping to create a public record of events that US counter proliferation experts continue to claim that US clandestine services knew nothing about In the end, Khan s fall came through a complex series of events, the linchpin of which was the decision of his Libyan customers in late 2003 to come clean about the fact that they had contracted with Khan and Pakistan for a 100m turnkey nuclear weapons facility Confronted by the CIA with undeniable evidence of Khan s activities, Pakistani President Mushareff in February 2004 placed Khan under house arrest and forced him to make a public mea culpa By that time, of course, Iranian enrichment efforts were already in swing, and the prospect of a second unstable Islamic country getting a bomb loomed large.

  4. says:

    This little book is packed with info interesting to me as a lay reader ie, all I know about nuclear science and nuclear proliferation is what I ve absorbed from occasional newspaper articles and it s accessibly written, too I see there s an review that severely critiques Langewiesche s description of the science in the nuclear bombs that went off over Japan fair enough, I don t know enough about the subject to notice such errors My interest was in the details of how nuclear proliferation happened Langewiesche s account jumps around a bit and spends time than necessary on the personal life of Abdul Qadeer Khan, the Pakistani nuclear scientist who stole info on making nuclear bombs and leaked it to other countries Nonetheless, I found the narrative eye opening While dragging the United States into a disastrous war in the pursuit of phantom weapons programs in Iraq, the US government condoned the tangible actions of Pakistan, which was delivering nuclear weapons capabilities into the hands of America s most significant enemies, including regimes with overt connections to Islamic terrorists Oh, the irony I ve read documentation from elsewhere about the stuff in the first clause, and this book documents the stuff in the second Seems to me that juxtaposing the two constitutes context for thinking about the big picture, not a cheap political shot This quote from a Pakistani source stood out for me, too The best way to fight proliferation is to pursue global disarmament Fine, great, sure, if you expect that to happen But you cannot have a world order in which you have five or eight nuclear weapon states on the one hand, and the rest of the international community on the other There are many places like Pakistan, poor countries which have legitimate security concerns every bit as legitimate as yours And yet you ask them to address these concerns without nuclear weapons, while you have nuclear weapons and everything else It is not a question of what is fair or right or wrong It is simply not going to work.

  5. says:

    In this sobering report, William Langewiesche formerly at The Atlantic Monthly and now at Vanity Fair asserts that there is no way to prevent Third World countries from obtaining nuclear weapons We can only accept the equalities of a maturing world in which many countries have acquired atomic bombs, and some may use them, he claims Critics praised Langewiesche s concise, clearheaded prose and rigorous investigation techniques However, they were disappointed that the previously published articles comprising the book had not been thoroughly reworked into a fluid narrative, which results in an awkward structure, clumsy transitions, and multiple repetitions A few also questioned his choice to end the book with a chapter on Mark Hibbs, a journalist covering the nuclear industry Although The Atomic Bazaar is not a perfect book, critics agreed that it is an extremely important one.

    This is an excerpt from a review published in Bookmarks magazine.

  6. says:

    The Atomic Bazaar is a short read, but highly informative Though, it would be accurate to label it a biography of sorts regarding one Dr Abdul Q Khan, as the majority of the book deals with him In fact, one could go so far as to say AQ Khan is the foremost nuclear proliferator.It highlights that for a terrorist group to steal a whole bomb is implausible, but to steal enriched uranium is plausible From there, it would just be a matter of obtaining the hardware, which the egotistical Khan would be than willing to provide for the right price.Langwiesche makes his disdain for US nuclear and foreign policy very well known This aside, the book is very straightforward At times, the prose seems like a fiction novel than a journalistic report This is not a negative thing rather, different than I expected.The Atomic Bazaar is a well researched read, and a recommended start for anybody curious to know about nuclear proliferation.

  7. says:

    I find this book educational it gives enough historical details, so I highly recommend it to readers We can be educated about the real nature of nuclear weapons why it has been a hot issue among the powerful nations Having read this book, I had realization that as an Asian living in a developing country, there is reason to be scared of your neighbors Though I hate nuclear proliferation, I find it somehow reasonable that in the name of national security since declaring war between two countries is unpredictable nowadays, it is not uncalled for this ambition just the likes of hostile reactions between Pakistan and India in 1998 Moreover, having read this book has revved my interest up in reading books on history, politics, and current affairs.

  8. says:

    I very rarely read non fiction policy books like this, much to the chagrin of my Georgetown government professors, I m surebut I REALLY LOVED another non fiction book by this author The Outlaw Sea read it read it so I figured I d give this one a try I definitely liked it and found it eminently readable than most others of the genre maybe because he used to be a Vanity Fair reporter, he really knows how to make a topic accessible without dumbing it down too much His political leanings staunch Democrat and opponent of GW Bush, war in Iraq, etc are very apparent, but don t overwhelm the story In fact, that s what he does well here tells a story, while still giving you a pretty good factual based commentary on nuclear proliferation.

  9. says:

    The Atomic Bazaar dives into the main issues surrounding nuclear weapons Those issues are the primarily defensive nature of nuclear bombs unless someone is crazy enough to use one , the problem with nations that have bombs telling other nations they should not have them, as technology increases it will be harder to keep these weapons out of people hands, and how the threat of terrorism is amplified because of the amount of damage that one person could inflict This book also gives a short chronological history of nuclear weapons.

  10. says:

    There is no scathing indictment of the callowness of the Bush administration.

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